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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the distributional consequences of the tax credits implemented by the 
Federal Energy Tax Act of 1978. The distributional effects are of interest both for their own sake, 
and because they have implications for the cost-effectiveness of the credits. If rates of return to 
conservation are higher for individuals who consume less housing, as earlier evidence suggests, then 
conservation incentive programs can achieve larger benefits for a given cost if they are 
distributionally more progressive. 
We explain the amount of credit claimed by taxpayers using a tobit model, in which credits 
claimed are a function of variables that affect the net benefit of weatherization. We estimate the 
model using data from the 1979 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program conducted by the 
Internal Revenue Service. We find that credits claimed are significantly higher where winters are 
more severe, where energy prices are high or rising rapidly, and where individuals have higher 
incomes and spend more on housing. 
Progressivity indices based on Lorenz-Gini measures of inequality reveal that the tax credits 
were somewhat regressive, even holding climate and energy prices constant. This suggests that the 
credits may have been ineffectively targeted. In addition, we find no evidence that the credits had a 
measurable incentive effect, suggesting that they have largely provided windfall gains to households 
who would have insulated anyway. 
THE DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS OF THE 
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1. INTRODUCTION
Spurred initially by rising energy prices during the 1970's, utilities and government agencies 
at federal, state, and local levels have adopted policies that encourage or mandate energy 
conservation by households. Policies involving the least amount of market intervention have been 
informational or educational programs, such as home energy audits and appliance energy-efficiency 
labeling. At the other end of the spectrum have been regulatory measures, including insulation 
standards for buildings, fuel efficiency standards for automobiles, and more recently, national energy 
efficiency standards for appliances. In between have been incentive programs such as tax credits and 
low-interest loans for capital-intensive conservation measures. 
Such policies can be evaluated according to at least three criteria. First, does the policy 
satisfy principles of economic efficiency, by achieving greater net social benefits than alternative 
uses of the resources invested? Second, whether or not the objectives satisfy efficiency criteria, is the 
policy cost-effective in achieving its stated objectives at the least possible social cost? Third, what 
are the distributional consequences of the program-who enjoys the benefits, and who bears the 
costs? 
In an earlier study (Dubin and Henson, 1988), we found that rates of return to insulation 
upgrades were higher in smaller, less insulated houses in the Pacific Northwest. There is strong 
reason to believe that this conclusion is not specific to the Northwest, but reflects generally 
diminishing marginal productivity of insulation in the production of space-conditioning comfort. 
This suggests that cost effectiveness and distributional considerations are related: an incentive 
program that is distributionally more progressive-targeted at lower-income households who 
consume less housing-may achieve larger net returns. In addition, both the cost effectiveness and 
distributional consequences of a program depend on the amount of additional conservation that it 
induces. A policy that is regressive may be ineffectively targeted; if the policy also has little 
incentive effect, then it may largely represent a "windfall" gain to higher-income individuals who 
would have insulated anyway. 
In this paper we examine what has probably been the most important energy conservation 
incentive program at the federal level: the tax credits implemented by the Energy Tax Act of 1978. 
We are interested in the distributional consequences of the Act both for their own sake, and for their 
implications regarding cost effectiveness. Though these credits expired in 1985, many state tax 
credits and other federal and state incentive programs remain in effect. Inferences drawn from our 
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study of the 1978 federal credits are likely to have relevance for these programs. 
The Energy Tax Act has previously been studied by Hirst, Goeltz, and Manning (1983). 
Using state-level Statistics of Income (SOI) data from the Internal Revenue Service for the tax years 
1978-1980, they found that conservation expenditures increase with household income, fuel 
expenditure, and winter severity. In this study we focus on the 1979 tax year, using data from the 
IRS Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) aggregated by IRS district and audit 
class. The TCMP data provide greater cross-sectional variation than do the SOI data, permitting us 
to analyze the effects of a broader set of causal factors. 
Our results are consistent with those of Hirst, Goeltz, and Manning. In addition, we find 
larger energy tax credits taken where energy prices are high or rising rapidly, and where housing 
expenditures are higher. Using progressivity indices based on Lorenz-Gini measures of inequality, 
we find that the distribution of observed credits claimed is somewhat regressive. Modified indices, 
which control for non-income factors, give virtually identical results. Thus the primary beneficiaries 
of the tax credits appear to have been those households for whom the rates of return to 
weatherization were lowest. 
In the following section we develop a model of residential energy conservation behavior that 
predicts which households will be more likely to weatherize, and to take the energy tax credit. The 
model explains why many consumers choose not to weatherize at all. Section 3 describes the Energy 
Tax Act of 1978 and the data used to estimate the model. We present results in Section 4 and
discuss implications in Section 5. Section 6 summarizes and concludes. 
2. A THEORETICAL MODEL OF CONSERVATION BERA VIOR
This section develops a model in which consumers demand for energy is determined jointly 
with the choice of a level of improvement in the thermal integrity of the dwelling. Using the 
household production framework, we assume that the household derives utility from consumption of 
a vector of purchased goods Z and a level of space conditioning comfort t, according to the utility
function U (t, Z). We interpret t as "indoor degree-days" of comfort consumed relative to the indoor
temperature that would exist in the absence of any space conditioning. Comfort is produced from 
purchased energy inputs, using a technology that depends on the climate and on the thermal integrity 
of the house. Higher comfort levels can be achieved through increased use of energy, holding 
thermal integrity constant, or through improvements in the energy efficiency of the dwelling. 
Because both energy and conservation measures are costly, the consumer faces a trade-off between 
comfort and other goods. 
Let Q (t, w; t°) define the energy required to maintain comfort level t when the outdoor
temperature is t0 and the consumer has undertaken a thermal improvement in the amount w. We
denote w = 0 as the initial level of energy efficiency, which like t0 is assumed to be exogenous.
With positive but diminishing marginal products of both energy and conservation inputs, we have 
Q, > 0, Q1 1 > 0, Qw < 0, Qww > 0, and Q1w < 0, where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
Energy can be purchased at a price of p per BTU, and thermal improvement can be 
purchased at a cost of m (w ), where m (0) = 0 and m '(w) > 0. Let t1 and ts be the federal and state
marginal tax rates, respectively. The federal government allows a proportion r1 of energy 
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conservation expenses to be credited against the individual's tax bill. The state allows the taxpayer 
to take a credit at rate rs, and/or to deduct from income a fraction ds of the improvement. Assuming 
that state income taxes are deductible on the federal return, but that federal taxes are not deductible 
on the state return, the effect of incentives is to make the after-tax cost of conservation equal to 
(1) 
With interest rate i, the annualized cost of conservation is ic (w ). 
Let I be after-tax income in the absence of conservation incentives. The consumer's 
decision problem is to allocate I optimally among energy inputs, conservation measures, and other 
goods to achieve maximum utility. That is, to 
maximize U (t, Z) t,Z,w 
subject to: Z +pQ(t,w;t°') +ic(w)�/ and (t,Z, w);;::: 0. 
The associated Lagrangian is 
L = U(t,Z) + A.[I-Z -pQ(t,w; t°')-ic(w)] 
where A is the Lagrange multiplier. The solution to this problem is characterized by the Kuhn­
Tucker conditions: 
L1 = U, - 'ApQ,(t,w; t0)�0 
tL1 = t [U1  -'ApQ,(t ,w; t0)] = 0 
Lz = Uz -A.�O 
ZLz = Z(Uz -A) = 0 
Lw = -/..[pQw (t ,w; t°') + ic '(w )] � 0 
wLw = - wA.[pQw(t,w; t°') +ic'(w)] = 0
(2) 
(3) 
(4a) 
(4b) 
(4c) 
(Sa) 
(Sb) 
(Sc) 
(6a) 
(6b) 
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w ;;::o (6c) 
L"' = I -Z -pQ(t ,w; t0) -ic(w);;:: 0 (7a) 
AL"'= A.[/ -Z -pQ(t,w; t0)-ic(w)] = 0 (7b) 
(7c) 
Solving (4a)- (7c) yields optimal values (t*, Z*, w*) as functions of I ,p, and t0• 
If both (4c) and (Sc) hold as strict inequalities, then (4a) and (Sa) must hold as equalities. In 
this case we get 
(8) 
Thus, if nonzero quantities of energy and goods Z are purchased, then the marginal rate of
substitution between them depends on the "marginal price of comfort," pQ1 (t * ,w *; t°), which itself 
is a function of the thermostat setting and the thermal integrity of the structure. From (6a) - (6c) it 
follows that if w * > 0, then 
c'(w*) = -pQw(t*,w*; t°)li. 
A consumer undertaking an improvement in thermal integrity does so up to the point where the 
marginal cost of improvement equals the present value of the marginal reduction in energy costs, 
which again depends on t * and w *. 
(9) 
For many consumers (6a) will hold as a strict inequality, so that the optimal level of 
conservation activity is zero. Many conservation measures tend to be "lumpy," requiring relatively 
large outlays for materials and labor before any noticeable energy savings are obtained. This is 
especially true in areas with mild climates or low energy prices, or for insulation retrofits and solar 
space and water heating systems. Consumers upgrade their residences if and only if the marginal 
benefit, -pQwli, exceeds the threshold value c'(O). That is:
w* > 0 iff -pQw(t*,O; t0)!i > c'(O). 
The amount of credit is then equal to1 
if w* >0 
if w*=O. 
Changes in I, p , and the components of c (w) have two effects: they change the amount of
conservation among those already conseiving, and they change the number of individuals 
(10) 
(11) 
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conserving. 
Income has three separate effects on Y. First, since comfort is a normal good, higher income
should be associated with a higher level oft. Therefore, as Qw1 < 0, a higher level oft will increase 
the marginal benefit (-pQwli ) from improving any initial level of thermal integrity. However, 
higher-income individuals are likely to have higher initial levels of insulation, which tends to reduce 
the amount of credit taken. The third effect is an institutional one: the credit can be claimed only by 
taxpayers who use the 1040 long form-not by 1040A short form filers, who tend to have lower 
income on average. Overall, credit claims should increase with income, though this is not 
unambiguous. 
Like income, increases in the size of the dwelling have an ambiguous effect on credit claims. 
In larger houses the price of comfort is higher, increasing the marginal benefit of weatherizing. 
However, the marginal productivity of a given amount of insulation is smaller, reducing the net 
benefit of weatherizing. Dubin and Henson (1988) show that the latter effect may be relatively large. 
Both higher energy prices and more severe climates increase the marginal price of comfort 
pQ1, thus increasing the marginal benefit of weatherizing for any given thermostat setting. However, 
higher comfort prices also reduce the optimal indoor temperature, reducing marginal benefits. Since 
the latter effect is probably relatively small, tax credit claims should be higher in areas with colder 
climates and higher energy prices.2 In addition, households in areas where energy prices have been
rising more rapidly are likely to be further from their equilibrium levels of insulation, and hence 
likely to take larger credits. 
Federal claims should also be higher where state tax incentives are larger. Since state taxes 
are deductible on the federal return, a state credit will reduce marginal retrofit costs (1 -t1) times as 
much as a federal credit of equal amount, and therefore should have a proportional effect on 
conservation activity. A state deduction of the same proportion would reduce retrofit costs ts times 
as much as a state credit. If tax credits in general have a significant incentive effect, then federal 
claims should be higher where state credit rates are higher. 
Thus the optimal amount of credit taken is a function of income, the level and rate of change 
of energy prices, climate, the size and other characteristics of the housing unit, the availability of 
state incentives, and other factors whose effects we assume to be randomly and independently 
distributed. In the following section we describe the sources and measurement of these explanatory 
variables. 
3. THEDATA
The purpose of the Energy Tax Act of 1978 was to reduce energy consumption and 
encourage the development and use of alternate energy sources. The Energy Tax Act allowed a tax 
credit to be taken based on qualified energy conservation expenditures and renewable energy 
expenditures. The credit was available from April 20, 1977 until December 31, 1985 but could not 
be claimed for tax years prior to January 1, 1978. We focus on 1979 tax returns, which report credits 
taken from January 1, 1979 until December 31, 1979.3
The primary data for this study are based on IRS audits of approximately 50,000 taxpayers 
under the 1979 Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program. For each of these taxpayers, the 
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TCMP audits record every item on the standard tax form as self-reported by the taxpayer and as 
assessed by the TCMP auditor.4 Since the Internal Revenue Code prohibits the IRS from releasing
individual return data in a way that might allow someone to identify taxpayers, or that might allow 
researchers to identify the criteria by which returns are selected for audit, the data are aggregated in 
various ways. For example, the 1979 IRS data provide averages across occupations and IRS 
districts, as well as averages by district and return preparation code (no assistance, IRS assisted, CPA 
assisted, and so forth). 
In our study we use only a small fraction of these data. We focus on a subset of variables 
that include the location by IRS district, audit class, adjusted gross income, real estate taxes, 
mortgage payments, and the residential energy credit. The data we use are aggregated across 
individuals by audit class and IRS district. Table 1 defines the twelve audit classes. With 58 IRS 
districts, we have a total of 12 x 58 = 696 potential observations. Eight of these contain no returns, 
leaving 688 valid observations. For each observation we are given the number of returns of each 
type and the dollar amounts for each line item. 
[TABLE 1 about here] 
Table 2 reports the distribution of expenditures for tax year 1979 by size of adjusted gross 
income. Of approximately 90 million returns filed, 4.9 million, or 5.4 percent, claimed a credit for 
residential energy expenditures. Of those 4.9 million returns, 4.8 million, or 98 percent, were for 
energy conservation and only 2 percent were for renewable energy expenditures. The majority of 
returns claimed the credit for energy conservation expenditures related to insulation and for storm 
windows and doors (82 percent of the dollar amount claimed).5 Our analysis focuses on the columns
in Table 2 labeled Total Residential Energy Credit, although it should be clear that these are 
predominately related to energy conservation expenditures for insulation and storm windows and 
doors. 
[TABLE 2 about here] 
We supplement the TCMP data with state-level energy prices from the State Energy Price 
and Expenditure Report, 1970-1982 of the Energy Information Administration (1985). Our measure 
of the price of energy is the average price of all energy used by the residential sector, in dollars per 
million BTU. The unavailability of substate data forces us to attribute equal energy prices to all 
districts within each of the six states having more than one IRS district. These states are New York 
(with four districts), California, lliinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Texas (each with two). 
State population-weighted normal heating and cooling degree-days for the period 1951-
1980 are taken from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (1985a, 1985b).6 For
substate IRS districts, normals are calculated using divisional data from NOAA (1981). Because 
heating and cooling degree-days are highly correlated at the IRS district level, we use only heating 
degree-days to proxy the effects of the temperature distribution. 
Data on state tax incentives are from Appendix A of Rodberg and Schachter (1980). In 
1979, twenty-two states provided income tax credits and/or deductions. Of these, fourteen states 
7 
relied exclusively on credits (seven allowing claims both for renewable-energy equipment and for 
conservation measures, and seven allowing only renewables); five used only deductions (three for 
both renewables and conservation, and two for renewables only); and three states used some 
combination of credits and deductions. 7 Among states allowing credits, all but California allowed a 
percentage that was invariant to whether the federal credit was claimed. The California law allowed 
a maximum credit of 55 percent (the largest allowed by any state), which was reduced by the amount 
of any federal credit taken. 
Table 3 lists the definitions of all variables used in the analysis. The dependent variable, 
A VCR, is the average dollar amount of credit claimed per return filed. The average mortgage 
interest and real estate tax deductions, AVMORT and A VRLTX, are included as proxies for housing 
expenditure. The CALIF dummy variable is included due to that state's substitutability of the 
federal credit for its own, which we expect to reduce the amount of federal claims. Dummy 
variables for each of the seven IRS regions are included to capture geographical effects not measured 
by variation in price, income, and climate. 8 
[TABLE 3 about here] 
Table 4 presents variable means and standard deviations by region, weighted by the number 
of returns filed. For example, ST A TECR is the proportion of taxpayers facing a state tax credit, not 
the proportion of states in the region that offer a credit The proportion of returns claiming the 
credit, PRCREDIT, ranges from over seven percent in the North Atlantic region, followed by the 
Mid-Atlantic and Midwest, to less than four percent in the West, Southwest, and Southeast. Though 
not used directly in our analysis, the conditional average credit (the credit claimed by taxpayers 
taking the credit), is given in Table 5. It is interesting that the West, with the smallest proportion of 
credits claimed, has the largest average credit claimed among those taking the credit. There appears 
to be no systematic relationship across IRS districts between the conditional average credit and the 
proportion of taxpayers claiming the credit. 
[TABLES 4 and 5 about here] 
The average credit per return filed, A VCR, is by definition the product of the conditional 
average credit and the proportion of taxpayers filing claims. It is generally higher in regions with 
colder climates, higher incomes, and high and rapidly rising energy prices-although the Southeast, 
with the smallest average credit, had the highest average energy prices in 1979. However, 
intraregional variability in energy prices was also large in that region. From Table 4 it is difficult to 
identify a relationship between AVCR and housing expenditure. The average credit appears to vary 
directly with the real estate deduction, though not with the mortgage interest deduction. 
4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS
The foregoing discussion suggests that the average credit claimed by taxpayers in the jth 
district/audit class group follows a tobit specification (see Tobin (1958), Maddala (1983)): 
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if yj >0 
otherwise (12) 
where Xj is the vector of the exogenous variables discussed above, u j is an error term assumed to be 
normally distributed with mean zero and variance cr2, and � is a vector of parameters to be estimated. 
Observations for which Yj talces a value of zero occur for those groups in which w * = 0 for all
taxpayers. From Tables 4 and 5 we see that 529 of 688 observations have nonzero credit claims, 
leaving 159 observations, or 23 percent of the sample, censored at zero. 
It is well-known that the expectation of the error term in equation (12) is nonzero and 
depends on Xj , so that ordinary least squares estimates of � are biased and inconsistent. This is true 
whether one uses all of the observations, or only the nonzero values of Y. We account for censoring 
by estimating the model by maximum likelihood, weighting each observation by the number of 
returns filed in the group to correct for heteroscedasticity caused by variation in group size. 9 
Results are presented in Table 6. For comparison, we also present weighted least squares 
' 
(WLS) estimates, which fail to account for censoring. The results show that consumers claim 
significantly larger credits where energy prices are higher-and where, holding the level of prices 
constant, they have been rising more rapidly. Taxpayers in colder climates take larger credits, and 
Schedule C filers appear to take smaller ones. The regional dummy variable for the Southeast, which 
has the smallest average credit in the sample, is omitted. Residents of the Mid-Atlantic, Central, and 
Southwest regions talce larger credits than those in the Southeast for reasons that cannot be explained 
by regional variation in prices, incomes, and other variables in the model. 
[TABLE 6 about here] 
Two results are particularly significant, in both a statistical and an economic sense. First, 
taxpayers who spend more on housing, measured by A VMORT and A VRL TX, talce larger credits-­
though WLS underestimates the effect of A VMORT. Second, even after taking these effects into 
account, income is still an important variable. To account for a nonlinear relationship between 
income and conservation expenditures, we include squared and cubed income terms. All income 
terms are significant at the one percent level. The coefficients suggest that the amount of credit 
talcen increases up to an income level of about $35,400-which is at the 97th percentile of 
households ranked by adjusted gross income. As income increases above this level, credit claims 
decline until income reaches the $92,000-$95,000 range, or the 99.7th percentile. We discuss the 
implications of this relationship further in the next section. 
Tax credit claims increase less than proportionally with energy prices, income, heating 
degree-days, and housing expenditures near the sample means of these variables. Elasticities range 
from .08 for A VMORT to .80 for A VINC.10 Following McDonald and Moffitt (1980), the total
effect of a change in an explanatory variable can be decomposed into two parts: the effect on the 
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amount of credit taken by those who take the credit, weighted by the the probability the credit is 
taken; and the effect on the probability of taking the credit, weighted by the expected value of the 
credit if taken. With 529 of 688 observations (or 77 percent of our sample) having nonzero values 
for A VCR, changes in the amount of credit taken for those taking the credit account for 55 percent of 
the total effect. 
As noted previously, if energy tax credits in general stimulate additional conservation, then 
federal credit claims should be higher in states having more generous programs. The statistical 
insignificance of the coefficient on STA TECR indicates that federal claims are unresponsive to the 
presence of state credits.11 In addition, federal claims do not appear sensitive to the provision in the 
California law that reduced the state credit by the amount of federal credit taken. Thus, the data do 
not reveal a statistically significant incentive effect of energy tax credits.12 
5. DISTRIBUTIONAL EFFECTS
If the energy tax credits had little incentive effect, then they were largely a windfall, 
redistributing wealth from taxpayers in general to those filing claims. This raises the question: what 
were the distributional effects? Our empirical results show a strong income effect on credits 
claimed. Were the credits distributionally progressive, regressive, or neutral? Furthermore, equity 
considerations aside, the distributional issue has important efficiency implications. If rates of return 
to conservation are higher for lower-income households, as our earlier work suggests, then the 
program's social rate of return should increase with the degree of progressivity. 
To examine the progressivity of the energy tax credits, consider Figure 1. The curve labeled 
"I" is the Lorenz curve, which plots the cumulative percentile of income on the vertical axis, against 
the percentile of households ranked by income on the horizontal axis. The curve labeled "C " plots 
the cumulative percentile of energy credit taken along the vertical axis, against the same horizontal 
axis, and is the so-called "concentration curve" of the tax credit (see Kakwani, 1977). The figure 
indicates, for example, that the poorest 50% of households ranked by income received 20% of all 
income and claimed 8% of all energy credits taken If the amount of credit claimed were exactly 
proportional to income, then the two curves in Figure 1 would coincide. The credit curve lies below 
the income curve at low income levels, and above the income curve at high incomes, because the 
shares of tax credit claimed by households at both ends of the income distribution are less than their 
shares of income. In particular, the poorest third of all households claimed only 1.5% of all credits. 
[FIGURE 1 about here] 
The degree of inequality in the distribution of income across households can be summarized 
by the Gini coefficient, which is the ratio of the area between the I curve and the 45-degree line, 
divided by the total area under the latter. The Gini coefficient ranges from zero, indicating perfect 
equality, to one, indicating perfect inequality. The Gini coefficient for income (G1) in Figure 1 is 
.423. The corresponding Gini measure for the C curve measures the degree of inequality in the 
distribution of energy credit across households ranked by income; this concentration index (Ge) is 
.572. 
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The extent to which the concentration curve of the tax credit lies below the income Lorenz 
curve indicates the regressivity of the energy credit. We can construct an index of tax credit 
progressivity as (AC /Al) - 1, where AC is the area under the C curve and AI is the area under the I 
curve.· The index equals zero for a proportional credit. For a progressive (regressive) credit, the C 
curve lies above (below) the I curve, giving the index a positive (negative) value. If the two curves 
do not intersect, the index is equal to (G1 - Ge )/(1- G1 ). Following Kiefer ( 1984) we call this the 
KP index, due to its relationship to variant 1 of the yield-neutral coefficient of progression (YNCPl) 
of Khetan and Poddar (1976).13
Khetan and Poddar proposed a second variant (YNCP2), which is related to another 
progressivity index proposed by Suits (1977). This index is calculated from a single concentration 
curve that relates the cumulative percentile of credit taken on the vertical axis, against the 
cumulative percentile of income on the horizontal axis, as in Figure 2. The Suits version for a credit, 
which we call the S index, is defined as (A ID) - 1, where A is the area under the concentration 
curve and D is the area under the 45-degree line. For a proportional credit the concentration curve 
will coincide with the diagonal, giving the index a value of zero. Like the KP index, this measure 
will be positive or negative depending on whether the credit is progressive or regressive. As pointed 
out by Suits and by Kiefer, this index has the advantage that the progressivity index for a system of 
tax (or credit) measures is a weighted average of their individual indices, using average tax (or 
credit) rates as weights. 
[FIGURE 2 about here] 
The KP and S indices for the observed credit taken are -.259 and -.122, respectively. 
These values suggest a somewhat regressive credit. In comparison, Suits estimated S indices for 
1970 of +.17 for the individual income tax, -.15 for sales and excise taxes, -.13 for payroll taxes, 
and -.09 for personal property and motor vehicle taxes. The tax credit appears to be roughly as 
regressive as payroll or personal property taxes. 
Gini-type inequality measures have been criticized for a wide variety of reasons. One 
limitation of the S index, pointed out by Suits and by Davies (1980), is that because it is an average 
over the entire income distribution, it cannot be used to unambiguously rank taxes whose 
concentration curves intersect The Gini index of income inequality has been critiqued on welfare 
grounds by Atkinson (1970), Dasgupta, Sen, and Starrett ( 1973), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1973), 
Blackorby and Donaldson (1978), and Kiefer (1984). Still, such measures are widely used, and 
provide some means for informing policy decisions provided their limitations are recognized. 
Paglin (1975) has criticized the Gini index on different grounds. By failing to adjust for the 
age profile of income, the Gini coefficient overstates the degree of lifetime inequality across 
households. Rather than using equal annual incomes as the standard of equality against which the 
actual income distribution should be measured, he argues that a more reasonable standard of equality 
would be equal lifetime incomes. In a suggestion modified by Formby and Seaks (1980), Paglin 
recommends calculating the Gini coefficient using as a reference line not the 45-degree line of 
perfect equality, but the concentration curve of average income by age group. 
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Our tax credit progressivity indices may suffer from a similar shortcoming. The relationship 
between energy tax credit claims and income may deviate from proportionality due to variation in 
energy prices, climate, and other factors. For example, if incomes tend to be higher in areas where 
the climate is more severe, or where energy prices have been high or rising rapidly (such as the 
Northeast), then the tax credit might be more regressive due to the added effects of these variables on 
credits claimed. How regressive is the energy tax credit for a given set of energy prices, 
temperature, and other variables? Holding constant non-income sources of variation in credits 
claimed, is the credit more, or less, regressive? 
To answer these questions, we ask what the distribution of the tax credit would look like if 
all taxpayers were identical except for income-related sources of variation. We simulate this 
distribution by using the tobit model to generate predicted values of A VCR, setting all variables 
other than income, housing expenditure, and filing status equal to their weighted sample means. The 
extent to which this simulated distribution deviates from the distribution of income provides a 
measure of.the extent to which the tax credit deviates from proportionality, holding non-income 
sources of variation constant. This allows us to compute an index based on the partial relationship 
between income and credit claimed. The concentration curves produced by this experiment coincide 
almost perfectly with those of the observed credit in Figures 1 and 2. The partial KP and S indices 
based on these curves are -.254 and -.126, respectively-virtually identical to those calculated from 
the observed distribution. 14
In summary we see that the energy tax credits were somewhat regressive, even holding 
constant non-income sources of variation. Lower-income taxpayers, who we expect to have higher 
rates of return to weatherization, shared less than proportionally in the benefits of the program.15 In
addition to the equity implications, this suggests that the credits could have been more effectively 
targeted. 
6. CONCLUSIONS AND SUMMARY
In this paper we have formulated and estimated a model of energy tax credits claimed by 
households. We have found that individuals take larger credits where the marginal net benefits of 
weatherizing are greater-where winters are more severe, and where energy prices are high or have 
been rising rapidly. 
We have also found that tax credit claims increase with housing expenditure, and with 
income up to about the 97th percentile of the income distribution. We find no evidence that the tax 
credits had a measurable incentive effect on conservation expenditures, suggesting that the credits 
were largely a windfall for claimants. 
Progressivity indices show that the energy tax credit is about as regressive as payroll or 
personal property taxes, even holding climate and energy prices constant. It is perhaps not surprising 
that a tax credit for an activity such as weatherization would tend to be regressive. Still, as much U. 
S. energy policy in the 1970's appeared to be more concerned with equity than with efficiency 
considerations, this would seem to have been an unintended result. 
Together with our earlier finding that rates of return to conservation are higher in smaller 
houses, the regressivity of the tax credits takes on added importance. The credits cost the federal 
government $499 million in forgone tax revenue in 1979 alone. Our results suggest that greater 
energy savings could have been achieved for the same cost by targeting the credit at taxpayers who 
consume less housing, perhaps through credit rates that vary inversely with income, or with the 
mortgage interest or property tax deduction. 
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was provided by the Exxon Foundation through the California Institute of Technology
Environmental Quality Laboratory. Sandie Ellis provided valuable research assistance. All
remaining errors are our own.
1. The Energy Tax Act, in fact, specified a minimum credit of $10, corresponding to a minimum
expenditure of $67 (the credit rate was 15 percent). Hence Y is actually positive and equal to
r1 m (w*) only when m (w*) exceeds $67, not zero. This shift of the threshold merely changes
the constant tenn in the model and is inconsequential for estimation. More seriously, a
maximum credit limit of $300 suggests that the sample may be censored from above as well as
from below. However, as discussed below, we use aggregate data on the average credit taken
per return filed and therefore we do not observe any values of Y at the upper limit.
2. This is the so-called "rebound effect" Dubin, Miedema, and Chandran (1986) estimate that this
effect reduces conservation savings by one to thirteen percent of engineering predictions for
air-conditioning and space heating in Florida. Dubin and Henson (1988) estimate the rebound
effect to be about one-third of the engineering prediction of space heating usage in the Pacific
Northwest.
3. Credits taken on qualified conservation expenditures were limited to 15 percent of expenditures
(materials and installation charges) up to $2,000 for the principal residence if built prior to 
April 20, 1977. Qualified expenditures consisted of insulation, stonn windows and doors,
caulking and weather stripping, and automatic energy-saving setback thennostats.
Renewable energy credits were available for expenditures on solar, geothennal, and wind 
source development. Until 1979, the credit was limited to 30 percent of the first $2,000 and 20 
percent of the next $8,000 of expenditure. Beginning in 1980, these limits were revised to 40 
percent on the first $10,000 of expenditure but were still limited to the taxpayer's principal 
residence. 
4. While not directly the focus of the present paper, we note that the TCMP data allow us to
analyze the actual credit taken as corrected by TCMP audits. This is preferable to the self­
reported data as published in Statistics of Income, which may be subject to significant bias.
5. Ninety percent of expenditures for renewable energy sources were for solar.
6. Heating degree-days are calculated as follows: Let th be the daily high temperature and t1 be
the daily low, and define the daily average as ta = ( th + t1 )12. Let th be a "base" temperature,
typically 65 degrees Fahrenheit. The number of heating degree-days are calculated as
HDD 
= 
max( tb - ta , 0). Annual heating degree-days are found by summing this quantity over
the year. Cooling degree-days are defined as CDD = max(ta - tb, 0).
7. The states allowing only a credit for renewables were Arizona, Delaware, Maine, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, and Vennont; those using only credits but allowing both
renewables and conservation measures were Alaska, California, Hawaii, Michigan, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Wisconsin. Alabama, Arkansas, and Idaho used only deductions but applied them
to both renewables and conservation; Colorado and Texas allowed deductions for renewables
only. Kansas and Montana allowed a credit for renewables and a deduction for conservation 
measures; Massachusetts allowed both a credit and a deduction for renewables only. 
8. Due to the unavailability of state-level price indices, we have not adjusted dollar amounts for
interstate variation in prices.
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9. The aggregate model is related to the micro-level model of individual taxpayers as follows. Let
Y;j, X;j, and u;j be the credit taken, the explanatory variables, and the error term for individual
i in group j . Let O;j = 1 if taxpayer i takes the credit, 0 otherwise. Let Nj be the number of
Ni 
taxpayers in group j, and nj = Loij be the number claiming the credit. Then the micro-level
i=l 
model is:
if -piQ�(t;*,O; t;°)li > c '(O)
otherwise 
which can be written Y;j = O;j (Xu a. +  U;j ). The macro model is: 
1 � 1 � 1 � Y· 
= 
-"t"y . .  =-"t"f) .  x .  a.+ -"t"o .. u ..J N. £.J I) N. £.J I) I) N. £.J I) IJ.Ji=l Ji=l Ji=l 
Estimation of this latter equation requires information about the distribution of Xu. For 
example, if it were known that all taxpayers in group j faced identical exogenous variables so 
that X;j = Xj, then it can be shown that E (Yj) 
= 
<f>(Xj aJa)Xj a.+ mj>(Xj ala), where Cf>( · ) and 
<!>(·) are the standard normal cumulative distribution and density functions, respectively. One 
could then proceed by weighted nonlinear least squares estimation of the equation 
Yj = E (Yj) + Wj. Lacking distributional information on X;j, we cannot estimate the micro 
parameters, a., and focus instead on the parameters of the aggregate model, �· 
10. Elasticities are calculated using the derivatives aE (Yj) I axj 
= 
<f>(Xj � I a)�. where Cf>( · ) is the
cumulative normal distribution (see McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). The amount of energy credit
claimed is also relatively inelastic with respect to PEN79(.65), GRPEN(.74), HDD(.36), and
A VRL TX(.36). All elasticities are significantly different from zero at the 10  percent level or
better.
1 1 . From equation ( 1), ac (()rt = (ac /ors)l(l - t1). Because both r1 and rs affect w* through 
changes in the budget constraint, a change in r1 should affect w* by 1/( 1- t1) as much as a 
change in rs. If federal credit claims respond to interstate variations in rs, then there is support 
for the proposition that tax credits in fact stimulate additional conservation expenditures. 
Specifications that use the state tax credit rate as an explanatory variable, rather than the 
dummy variable STATECR, produce insignificant results. 
12. The uncertainty surrounding this question in the literature is reflected in the title of a 1982
federal report, Studies on Effectiveness of Energy Tax Incentives are Inconclusive (U.S. General
Accounting Office, 1982).
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13. Khetan and Poddar define YNCP l to be positive for a progressive tax. Throughout this
discussion, we redefine these indices for credits to maintain the sign convention that a negative
value for an index indicates regressivity, and a positive value indicates progressivity.
14. We allow AVMORT, A VRLTX, SCHEDC, and SCHDEF to vary with income because income
is likely to strongly affect these variables. Modifying this experiment reveals that the
regressivity of the tax credit is due largely to the association between income and housing
expenditure; filing status has no significant effect on regressivity. For example, holding filing
status constant leaves the partial progressivity indices virtually unchanged. Holding housing
deductions constant as well, and allowing only income to vary, produces slightly progressive
KP and S values of +.10 and +.12, respectively. (However, in this latter case the concentration
curves for income and credit claimed intersect at about the 45th percentile of the income
distribution, below which the credit remains regressive.)
15. Why do individuals having higher rates of return to conservation undertake less of it? There is
some evidence that lower-income households have higher discount rates, therefore requiring a
higher rate of return on conservation investments. This may be partly due to the greater
uncertainty of their income streams. For example, see Hausman (1979).
16 
REFERENCES 
Atkinson, Anthony B. "On the Measurement of Inequality." Journal of Economic Theory, 2 (1970), 
244-263. 
Blackorby, Charles, and David Donaldson. "Measures of Relative Equality and Their Meaning in 
Terms of Social Welfare." Journal of Economic Theory, 18 (1978), 59-80. 
Dasgupta, Partha, Amartya Sen, and David Starrett. "Notes on the Measurement of Inequality." 
Journal of Economic Theory, 6 (1973), 180-187. 
Davies, David G. "Measurement of Tax Progressivity: Comment." American Economic Review, 
70, No. 1 (March 1980), 204-207. 
Dubin, Jeffrey A., and Steven E. Henson. "An Engineering/Econometric Analysis of Seasonal 
Energy Demand and Conservation in the Pacific Northwest." Journal of Business and Economic 
Statistics, 6, No. 1 (January 1988), 121-134. 
Dubin, Jeffrey A., Allen K. Miedema, and Ram V. Chandran. "Price Effects of Energy-Efficient 
Technologies: A Study of Residential Demand for Heating and Cooling." Rand Journal of 
Economics, 17, No. 3 (Autumn 1986), 310-325. 
Formby, John P., and Terry G. Seaks. "Paglin's Gini Measure of Inequality: A Modification." 
American Economic Review, 70, No. 3 (June 1980), 479-482. 
Hausman, Jerry A. "Individual Discount Rates and the Purchase and Utilization of Energy-Using 
Durables." Bell Journal of Economics, 10, No. 1 (Spring 1979), 33-54. 
Hirst, Eric, Richard Goeltz, and Hyldee Manning. "Analysis of Household Retrofit Expenditures." 
Energy Systems and Policy, 7, No. 4 (1983), 303-322. 
Kakwani, Nanak C. "Measurement of Tax Progressivity: An International Comparison." Economic 
Journal, 87 (March 1977), 71-80. 
_____ . "Applications of Lorenz Curves in Economic Analysis." Econometrica, 45, No. 3 
(April 1977), 7 19-726. 
Khetan, C. P., and S. N. Poddar. "Measurement of Income Tax Progression in a Growing Economy: 
The Canadian Experience." Canadian Journal of Economics, 9, No. 4 (November 1976), 613-
629. 
Kiefer, Donald W. "Distributional Tax Progressivity Indexes." National Tax Journal, 37, No. 4 
(December 1984), 497-513. 
Maddala, G. S. Limited-Dependent and Qualitative Variables in Econometrics. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
McDonald, John F., and Robert A. Moffitt. "The Uses of Tobit Analysis." Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 62 ( 1980), 318-321. 
Paglin, Morton. "The Measurement and Trend of Inequality: A Basic Revision." American 
Economic Review, 65, No. 4 (September 1975), 598-609. 
Rodberg, Leonard, and Meg Schachter. State Conservation & Solar Energy Tax Programs:
Incentives or Windfalls? Washington, D.C.: Council of State Planning Agencies, 1980. 
Rothschild, Michael, and Joseph E. Stiglitz. "Some Further Results on the Measurement of 
Inequality." Journal of Economic Theory, 6 (1973), 188-204. 
Suits, Daniel B. "Measurement of Tax Progressivity." American Economic Review, 67, No. 4 
(September 1977), 747-752. 
Thompson, Richard, and Rich Hillelson. "Residential Energy Credit 1978- 1980." Statistics of 
Income Bulletin, Fall 1982, 1-7. 
Tobin, Jam es. "Estimation of Relationships for Limited Dependent Variables." Econometrica, 26 
(1958), 24-36. 
U. S. Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. Divisional 
Normals and Standard Deviations of Heating and Cooling Degree Days 19 31-1980. 
( Climotography of the United States No. 85.) Asheville, N. C.: Author, 1981. 
____ (1985a). State, Regional, and National Monthly and Seasonal Heating Degree Days 
Weighted by Population (1980 census) July 1931 - June1985. (Historical Climatology Series 
5-1.) Asheville, N. C. : Authors, 1985. 
____ (1985b). State, Regional, and National Monthly and Seasonal Cooling Degree Days 
Weighted by Population (1980 census) January 1931 - December 1984. (Historical 
Climatology Series 5-2.) Asheville, N. C. : Authors, 1985. 
U.S. Department of Energy, Energy Information Administration. State Energy Price and 
Expenditure Report 1970-1982. Washington, D.C.: Author, 1985. 
U.S. General Accounting Office. Studies on Effectiveness of Energy Tax Incentives are 
Inconclusive. Washington, D.C.: Author, 1982. 
17 
18 
TABLE 1. Audit Class Definitions 
1. Non-business return; 1040A short fonn; standard deduction; total positive income (TPI) under 
. $ 10,000. 
2. Non-business return with TPI under $10,000; other than Audit Class 1. 
3. Non-business return with TPI of $10,000 - $25,000; standard deduction; no Schedule C, 
Schedule F, or Distributive Income. 
4. Non-business return with TPI of $10,000 - $25,000, other than Audit Class 3. 
5. Non-business return with TPI of $25,000 - $50,000. 
6. Non-business return with TPI greater than $50,000. 
7. Schedule C return with total gross receipts (TGR) under $25,000. 
8. Schedule C return with TGR of $25,000 - $100,000. 
9. Schedule C return with TGR greater than $100,000. 
10. Schedule F return with TGR under $25,000. 
11. Schedule F return with TGR of $25,000 - $100,000. 
12. Schedule F return with TGR greater than $100,000. 
TABLE 2. Residential Energy Expenditure 1979 
by Adjusted Gross Income* 
Total 
Size Residential 
of adjusted Energy 
gross Income Credit 
Number 
of Amount 
Returns 
TOTAL 4,911,119 498,967 
Under $5,000 62,778 7,076 
$5,000 under $10,000 313,926 33,575 
$10,000 under $15,000 542,141 50,360 
$15,000 under $20,000 761,780 73,591 
$20,000 under $25,000 857,505 78,163 
$25,000 under $30,000 790,869 77,549 
$30,000 under $40,000 931,451 97,145 
$40,000 under $50,000 315,940 34,958 
$50,000 under $75,000 220,502 28,569 
$75,000 under $100,000 58,242 8,301 
$100,000 under $200,000 46,625 7,878 
$200,000 or more 9,359 1,801 
* Amounts in thousands of dollars.
Source: Thompson and Hillelson (1982). 
Total 
Energy 
Consetvation 
Expenditure 
Number 
of Amount 
Returns 
4,781,772 3,302,364 
54,933 39,897 
293,750 206,906 
524,677 347,375 
749,281 497,881 
835,237 509,719 
776,305 517,945 
911,984 649,735 
311,960 234,465 
214,179 176,594 
55,715 54,528 
44,739 53,013 
9,014 14,306 
Total 
Total Stonn 
Insulation Windows 
Expenditure Expenditure 
Number Number 
of Amount of Amount 
Returns Returns 
2,896,338 1,331,718 2,543,590 1,403,014 
34,917 19,869 24,963 16,643 
172,943 105,698 156,170 77,114 
318,322 131,186 270,020 151,212 
463,361 208,714 401,702 208,817 
531,636 201,674 456,459 218,839 
464,371 202,807 427,839 230,829 
552,990 262,524 480,687 270,397 
186,038 87,285 166,221 102,144 
116,615 63,760 108,655 76,773 
28,704 21,716 27,396 22,785 
23,968 21,440 19,772 21,147 
4,473 5,046 3,706 6,314 
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Total 
Renewable 
Expenditure 
Number 
of Amount 
Returns 
76,555 190,283 
878 1,742 
4,823 6,591 
8,711 6,610 
8,177 13,912 
10,066 17,668 
9,179 43,901 
16,512 43,196 
5,675 15,612 
7,906 23,550 
2,286 6,900 
1,962 8,681 
380 1,901 
Variable 
AVCR 
AVINC 
AVMORT 
AVRLTX 
CALIF 
GRPEN 
HDD 
PEN79 
PR CREDIT 
SCHEDC 
SCHEDF 
STATECR 
TABLE 3. Variable Definitions 
Definition 
Average credit taken per return filed 
Average income per return, thousands of dollars 
Average mortgage deduction taken per return, hundreds of dollars 
Average real estate tax deduction per return, hundreds of dollars 
1 if California, 0 otherwise 
Average annual percentage rate of energy price increase 
Population-weighted average heating degree-days, 1951-80, thous. 
Price of energy to residential sector, 1979, $/million btu 
Proportion of returns claiming energy credit 
Schedule C return: (Audit classes 7, 8 and 9). 
Schedule F return: (Audit classes 10, 11, and 12). 
1 if state allows energy tax credit, 0 otherwise 
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TABLE 4 .  Variable Means and Standard Deviations by IRS Regions 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Variable Region 
1 3 4 5 6 8 9 
Entire North Mid-
Sample Southeast Midwest Central Southwest Atlantic Atlantic Western 
AVCR 5.23 2.97 5.45 5.65 3.50 7.53 7.91 4.13 
(7.71) (4.09) (7.12) (5.95) (5.98) (9.65) (9.78) (8. 17) 
AVINC 15.92 14.09 16.06 16.35 15.57 16.80 16.33 16.28 
(14.54) (12.88) (14.02) (13.91) (14.61) (17.36) (14.60) (14.15) 
AVMORT 5.28 4.39 5.01 4.39 5.20 3.96 4.84 8.28 
(7.79) (6.84) (7.02) (5.98) (7.74) (5.87) (7.07) (10.8 1) 
AVRLTX 2.07 1.02 2.10 1.84 1.23 3.95 2.60 1.86 
(3.56) (1.97) (3.25) (3.19) (2.19) (5.71) (4.09) (2.60) 
CDD 1.17 2.15 0.85 0.78 2.15 0.57 0.84 0. 88 
(0.83) (0.79) (0.30) (0.20) (0.81) (0.20) (0. 18) (0.79) 
GRPEN 1 1.41 12.04 10.80 11.98 9.94 12.68 12.38 10.32 
(1.49) (0.88) (0.38) (0.89) (2.31) (0.50) (0.66) (1.00) 
HDD 4.71 2.47 6.78 6.02 3.11  6.21 5.30 3.34 
(2.02) (1.17) (1.19) (0.70) (1.78) (0.88) (0.61) (1.78) 
PEN79 6.28 8.69 5.28 5.17 5.79 6.87 6.61 5.60 
(1.76) (2.18) (0.30) (0.24) (0.84) (0.19) (0.74) (2.23) 
PR CREDIT 0.052 0.035 0.068 0.060 0.035 0.074 0.068 0.031 
(0.067) (0.046) (0.076) (0.062) (0.049) (0.088) (0.077) (0.044) 
STATECR 0.298 0.172 0.177 0.302 0.215 0.248 0.019(a) 0. 806 
(0.457) (0.378) (0.382) (0.459) (0.411) (0.432) (0. 136) (0.396) 
Number of 
valid obs(b) 688 84 108 72 108 115(b) 72 129(b) 
Thousands 
of returns 90,371 13,201 12,687 12,252 11,917 12,102 12,21 15,995 
filed 
Notes: 
(a) In region 8, Delaware allowed a $200 credit for domestic solar hot water systems (Rodberg and Schachter, 1980, p. 
41). Lacking data on average expenditures and the average credit taken, we set STATECR= l for these observations. 
(b) Number of audit class/district categories in which at least one return was filed. Region 6 contains five empty cells : 
two districts (Providence and Manhattan) had no returns filed in audit classes 10 and 12, and one district (Brooklyn) 
had no returns in class 10. Three cells are empty in Region 9: classes 10 and 11 in the Anchorage district and class 
12 in Honolulu. 
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TABLE 5. Conditional Average Credit Taken by Claimants 
(Standard Deviations in Parentheses) 
Variable Region 
1 3 4 5 6 8 9 
Entire North Mid-
Sample Southeast Midwest Central Southwest Atlantic Atlantic Western 
Conditional 100.95 85.88 80.27 93.32 101.54 101.91 116. 11  134.86 
average credit (60.87) (37.31) (43.38) (36.10) (59.14) (32.36) (35.45) (138.84) 
Number of 
valid obs(a) 529 69 94 62 87 80 55 82 
Thousands 
of returns 4,686 455 861 741 411 894 832 490 
claiming credit 
Notes: 
(a) Number of audit class/district categories in which at least one taxpayer claimed the energy tax credit. 
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TABLE 6. Results 
(t-statistics in parentheses) 
VARIABLE WLS TOBIT 
CONSTANT - 13. 179*** -19. 1 1 1  *** 
(-4.590) (-5.082) 
PEN79 0.646*** 0.703*** 
(3.410) (2.926) 
GRPEN 0.328** 0.439** 
(2.003) (2.027) 
AVINC 0.428*** 0.743*** 
(7. 124) (9.467) 
(AVINC)2 -0.0078*** -0.014*** 
(-4.390) (-6.663) 
(AVINC)3 0.000035** 0.000074*** 
(2.506) (4.532) 
HDD 0.541 ** 0.5 19** 
(2.571) ( 1 .974) 
AVMORT 0.068 0. 108*
( 1 .426) (1 .877) 
AVRLTX 1 .260*** 1 . 175*** 
( 1 1 .996) (9.384) 
SCHEDC -2. 151  ** - 1 .893* 
(-2.512) (-1 .929) 
SCHEDF 0.709 -0.578 
(0.437) (-0.309) 
STATECR 0. 173 0.22 1 
(0.335) (0.338) 
CALIF -0.936 - 1 .286 
(-0.751) (-0.788) 
MIDWEST 1 .047 1 .753 
( 1 .077) ( 1 .409) 
CENTRAL 1.6 1 8* 2.313** 
( 1 . 8 14) (2.022) 
SOUTHWEST 2.306** 2.262* 
(2.573) ( 1 .930) 
NO. ATLANTIC -0.359 -0.047 
(-0.374) (-0.038) 
MID-ATLANTIC 2.363*** 3.216*** 
(2.814) (3.014) 
WESTERN 2.026** 1 .539 
(2. 1 10) ( 1 .254) 
Std. Error 8.2935 8.4839 
Note: Asterisks indicate statistical significance at critical levels of 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1 % (***). 
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